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Nowhere is the conflict between the professional values
of journalists and the values of ordinary people more
apparent in the UK than in press coverage of families
grieving for victims of accidents or crimes. Attempts
from the beginning of the 1990s to forbid press
intrusion into grief or shock have been steadily resisted
by the British Press Complaints Commission, whose
voluntary Code of Conduct requires journalists to make
inquiries and publish material with “sympathy and
discretion”. Editors argue that such inquiries are in the
interests of accuracy and may be welcomed by relatives
but the voluntary code fails to address the problems
posed by sensational journalism and its lack of
compassion and empathy for grieving families. 
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The quote in the title was attributed to Labour MP and
Minister for Europe Denis McShane. It was allegedly
spoken to a journalist who tried to question him and 
his former partner Carol Barnes as they arrived, in
obvious distress, at Melbourne airport in March 2004
following the death of their daughter Clare in a
skydiving accident. Later that week the Sun, Daily Mirror,
Daily Express, Daily Mail, Evening Standard and Daily
Telegraph printed long–lens photographs of the couple
grieving in the field where Clare Barnes’ body had been
discovered. (Greenslade 2004) 
Do journalists inhabit a different moral
universe to the person in the street? It is a truism in
debates about media ethics that journalists experience a
conflict between the canons of generally accepted moral
behaviour assumed to apply to all reasonable “ordinary
people” in western societies and a body of practices 
and values based on the assumption that journalists
have a unique role and mission in society. As Stephen 
H. Daniel put it: “The values of truth–telling, honesty
and fairness which we apply to communicators in
general fail to exercise a compelling force over many
journalists other than in the codes to which they give
lip–service. This is not to say that journalists have no
ethical standards; rather it says that the working ethical
standards of the journalist are determined by what 
he [sic] sees as contributing to his own (and ultimately, 
the public) good through the survival of his paper,
television station or job.” (Daniel 1992: 51–52) To this
list of values which fail to exercise “compelling force”
might be added compassion and the ability to empathise
with another human being. Many journalists are
suspicious of the claims of compassion as a form 
of post–modern narcissism which prioritises feeling 
over analysis in a populism of shared emotion.
According to the investigative journalist Tessa Mayes:
“The implication is that news reporters 
are less humane or fail to empathise with victims 
of tragedies if they attempt to be forensic in
gathering the news. Sadly, news reporters are more
likely to be judged on their personal morals and what
they feel about an event, rather than on the qualities
of factual accuracy and analysis.” (quoted in Keeble
2001: 140)
By implication, empathy and humanity are placed in the
sphere of “personal morals” against the professional
requirements of “factual accuracy” and “analysis”. Of
course, although Mayes assumes she is standing against
a tide of woolly thinking, her position has the support of
most accredited codes of journalistic conduct, including
the Code of Conduct operated by the British Press
Complaints Commission, where the 
first clause is not about respect for human rights or
press freedom, but accuracy:
“The Press must take care not to publish inaccurate,
misleading or distorted information, including
pictures…” (PCC 2004b)
Within the lifetime of today’s pensioners, profound
changes have occurred in our public attitudes towards
grief and mourning and our social practices may seem
impoverished when compared to the past. Geoffrey
Gorer’s profoundly influential study of attitudes to death
and grief in the early 1960s was based on a survey 
of 1,628 people undertaken in May 1963. Nothing had
changed about the emotional experience of grief, which
he described as “a deep, complex and long–lasting
psychological process with physiological overtones and
symptoms” (Gorer 1965: 53) but its social expression
had altered out of recognition. He concluded that,
compared to their grandparents, “the majority 
of British people are today without adequate guidance
as to how to treat death and bereavement and without
social help in living through and coming to terms with
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the grief and mourning which are the inevitable
responses in human beings to the death of someone
they have loved” (ibid: 110).
This was a huge change from the position
at the beginning of the last century when, with 
few exceptions “everybody knew how it would be
appropriate for him or her to behave and dress when
they suffered a bereavement and how to treat other
mourners” (ibid: 63). Writing a few years later, the
French historian Philippe Aries observed that, in Britain
and northern Europe, funeral rites had been reduced 
to “a decent minimum necessary to dispose of the
body”, that ceremonies were “discreet and avoid
emotion” and that, in agnostic England, “too evident
sorrow does not inspire pity but repugnance; it is a 
sign of mental instability or of bad manners: it is
morbid” (Aries 1976: 90).
This still remains broadly true, despite 
the explosion of support groups, charities and the
counselling industry since Gorer and Aries completed
their studies and despite the Diana phenomenon of
mass popular mourning. As a society we still observe 
a recognisable body of practices and have a general
sense of what constitutes proper behaviour, even if 
the rites themselves are maimed, truncated and partially
evacuated of meaning. We offer “sympathy” and
“support” by means of cards, notes, brief calls and
flowers. We offer help, even without the expectation
that it will be accepted. We don’t want “to intrude”
unless invited. In fact, we may practise avoidance by
crossing the road. We try to speak well of the dead. 
We may take part in a public ritual – in agnostic Britain
about the only time now that most of us enter a church
or temple. We are careful of the feelings of the
bereaved. We practise discretion. We may not wear 
a black tie or dress at the ritual but our choice of colours
will be muted and our dress will be whatever we
recognise as formal. Appearances are still important.
And we can recognise behaviour that appears to breach
these mores and register distaste or revulsion. 
For the press, the most dangerous debates
about conduct (in the sense that they may involve
widespread public distaste and revulsion and the threat
of legislation) occur when journalists are seen to be
transgressing a deep–rooted, popular social more.
During the controversy about press self–regulation
versus privacy legislation in Britain in the early 1990s,
one battleground was grief. Both the Calcutt Committee
and the House of Commons National Heritage
Committee heard harrowing evidence of systematic
harassment and doorstepping by reporters and
photographers of the relatives of accident or crime
victims. The MPs reserved their harshest language to
describe the treatment of the families of servicemen
killed in Northern Ireland:
“Despite the provision in the [Press Complaints
Commission] code the press started telephoning 
at 11 o’clock at night and kept the phone going 
all night. The family was also subjected to persistent
doorstepping. And, in what seemed to the
committee to be a callous and totally unacceptable
breach of the code, as well as more general canons 
of decency and compassion, the new widow, having
been persuaded to give an interview in order to
reduce press pressure, was asked by the
accompanying photographer to ‘look like a grieving
widow’” (National Heritage Committee 1993).
“Callous”, “unacceptable” and breaching “decency 
and compassion”: why does the demand “look like 
a grieving widow” (which sounds too neat, too
convenient to be an actual quote) draw such moral
obloquy? After all, although lacking in discretion, as a
good professional the photographer was surely
visualising what the reader would see and aiming to 
get the appearance to conform to the presumed reality
of widowhood. Of course, the crass imperative quality 
of the demand (“hurry up here”) certainly seems like 
an appalling lapse of manners and decorum. But
another reason for revulsion is presumably that the
demand seems to doubt the authenticity of the feeling
undergone by the subject (“you don’t really look like a
grieving widow”). This tension between the surface of
appearances and an inward state of pain that cannot
easily be communicated without the suspicion of
insincerity or play–acting brings an early, angry response
from Hamlet when his mother suggests that death is
“common” and that he really ought to start getting
over the death of his father:
“Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
Not customary suits of solemn black,
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
Nor the dejected haviour of the visage,
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief,
That can denote me truly. These indeed seem,
For they are actions that a man might play,
But I have that within which passes show;
These but the trappings and the suits of woe.” 
(Shakespeare 1963 Act 1, Scene ii lines 77 – 86)
Hamlet’s fierce rejection of “seemings” suggests a third
motive underlying both: a revulsion against being “played”
upon and turned into a stereotype as someone else’s
subject or thing for the interest and profit of an audience –
a vivid example of that process known as reification.
Another controversy over media intrusion
into grief arose in November 1993 following a crash 
on the M40 involving the death of 11 pupils from
Hagley Roman Catholic High School. The morning after
the crash the press were on hand outside the school 
to document the explosion of grief as the pupils learnt
of the death of their friends. This was not, by all
accounts, a media scrum but a successful exercise in
disaster management, with the press corralled a
respectful distance from the school and a team of
counsellors drafted in by the education authority to do
what they could to handle the distress. A media strategy
was in place – the press was kept at arms length and
didn’t get a scoop but in return was supplied with a
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story salted with some heartrending personal details 
and extremely powerful images. Most of the national
newspapers carried a particular iconic and strangely
impersonal image of grief – one pupil, her face almost 
a literal representation of the ancient mask of tragedy,
clutching a friend to her. Alongside a mosaic of smiling
school shots of the victims, released by the authority, the
effect was overwhelmingly sad. But some people found
the fashioning of two young people into an icon of grief
not just distasteful, but a cynical invasion of privacy. One
Guardian reader was revolted and wrote a stinging letter:
“If the publication by the Mirror Group newspapers
of ‘those’ photographs of the Princess of Wales
working out at a gym] is held to be an unacceptable
and unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the
subject, by what twisted set of moral values is it
possible to justify the publication of a large close up
photograph of two (clearly identifiable) young
schools girls as they hear of the death of 11 of their
friends in the M40 minibus crash?” (20 November) 
Any journalist could fashion a reply. The story raised
genuine public interest issues about road safety, accident
black spots, teachers taking on additional duties and the
need for new guidelines for school trips, such as having
a relief driver. Across the nation, millions of people were
shocked and saddened and anyone who had waited for
a child to return from a school outing could identify
with the families. If catharsis was needed, the press had
fashioned a masterly image.
But whatever the merits of allowing the
nation to sympathise vicariously, the unanswerable 
fact remained that the image was based on two pupils
whose consent to become a brief national icon could
only be notional. Why should their grief become a
public possession? In the light of abundant evidence 
of much worse behaviour, Calcutt had drawn up a
stringent clause for the editors’ Code of Conduct in
1990 which forbade any intrusion into grief or shock
(Robertson and Nicol 2002) and was designed to hold
editors to account for sending reporters to question
relatives. Unsurprisingly, the MPs of the 1993 National
Heritage Committee investigating privacy and media
intrusion (National Heritage Committee 1993) supported
his recommendation that the clause dealing with grief 
in the Editor’s code should state: “The press should not
intrude into personal grief or shock, in particular in the
aftermath of accidents and tragedies.”
But this has proved to be, alongside a privacy
law, one of the great non–negotiables for the British
press. Hotlines for complaints, lay members on the PCC to
sit alongside editors, limited third party complaints, tough
guidelines to protect children – all have been conceded
over the last 10 years. But grief has proven to be a
sticking–point that editors have refused to countenance.
In fact, the Editor’s Code Committee of the Press
Complaints Commission has stuck by a clause which
states the opposite: “In cases involving personal grief or
shock, enquiries must be carried out and approaches
made with sympathy and discretion.”
Enquiries and approaches must be made. So far the 
only change to this clause (now Clause 5 in the revised
code) was added in January 1998 in the febrile period
following the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, when
what seemed like a change in public sensibility, the
appearance of mounting popular support for privacy
legislation and widespread public revulsion against
paparazzi exacerbated the already calamitously low
public esteem in which newspaper journalists were held.
The emotional climate is memorably recollected by Neil
Ascherson, wandering down the Mall:
“It was one of the worst moments for Britain‘s tabloid
press. The people on the Mall had no doubts about
who had killed Diana. ‘She was hounded to death by
the media,’ they told me over and over again. But you
could not find a syllable of this huge popular verdict in
the tabloid newspapers. Terrified, the editors
suppressed it and changed the subject to the failings
of the Royal Family” (Ascherson 2002: 126–130).
One consequence was a series of panicky revisions 
to the code. These included an extension of 
the accuracy clause to deal with photo manipulation,
a revision to the clause on harassment to include
paparazzi–style persistent pursuit and an extension to
the clause on the protection of children’s privacy to all
children while at school (with Princes William and Harry
in mind). The PCC argues that collectively these revisions
led to “perhaps the toughest set of press regulations
anywhere in Europe” (PCC 2003b). One sentence was
added to Clause 5 to cover publication: “Publication
must be handled sensitively at such times, but this
should not be interpreted as restricting the right to
report judicial proceedings.” But this clause has been
seen as a blank cheque by journalists who have opened
it up to a wide range of interpretation. Take, for
instance, the evidence from this ruling:
“Mrs Dorothy Yeomans complained to the PCC 
that an article published in the Rhondda Leader on 15
January 2004 headlined ‘Starving pet starts to devour
pensioner’ was insensitive at a time of grief in breach
of Clause 5 The article reported the recent death of 
a man who had collapsed in his home. His sister
complained that the article was distressing and
included unnecessarily sensationalist details. The
newspaper appreciated that the complainant was
obviously distressed by her brother’s death. However,
it said that its enquiries – which were based on
information provided by a member of the public 
and then confirmed by two sources – were made
with sympathy and discretion. Given the unusual
circumstances of the case, it would have been easy 
to publish a sensationalised article, but the newspaper
believed that the construction of the story and its
headline had been handled sympathetically and with
appropriate sensitivity” (PCC 2004a).
Describing the headline as sensitive strained the credulity
even of the Press Complaints Commission and the
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Rhondda Leader was duly rebuked for “the overall tone
and gratuitous inclusion of some of the detail” in the
article. The PCC upheld the complaint under Clause 5
but qualified the judgement by noting that the article
was published before the funeral – implying that a
longer time lapse would have led to a different
judgement. A further qualification was that the details
had not been put into the public domain – implying that
if there had been an inquest the newspaper would have
been covered by its right to report judicial proceedings
unless instructed otherwise. 
This judgment and others like it under
Clause 5 prioritise grieving family members as “victims”
– members of a class of vulnerable people which
includes children, patients in hospital, victims of crime
and discrimination – and such protection is described by
the PCC as being “at the heart of the Code of Practice”
(PCC 2003b: 13). This has evolved as a consistent
rhetorical strategy. Whatever its merits as an accurate
description of the function and operation of the code,
the rhetoric serves two extremely useful purposes: i) it
implies that people who have a problem with the press
are a minority: a vulnerable species who must be
shielded by a friendly public–spirited body; a body “with
a heart” and ii) it tends to deflect the argument that
such people might have rights as citizens. The
continuing political agenda here is to defeat proposals
for a privacy law and slow the evolution of judicial
interpretations of the Human Rights Act in the direction
of a judge–built law of privacy. This political project is
part of a general role the PCC has developed in acting 
a propagandist for voluntary regulation and against legal
restrictions on the press: something described by its 
current chairman, Sir Christopher Meyer, as “acting as 
a shock absorber between a free press and a fractious
establishment” (PCC 2003c). 
In fact, the number of complaints to the PCC about
intrusion into grief or shock had been rising from a low
level before 1998 but in that year jumped significantly
from 2 per cent to 3.3 per cent out of a total of around
2,500. (See Table) Meanwhile there had been a marked
decline in complaints about accuracy – down from 73
per cent of all complaints in 1993 (PCC 1993) to 56.3
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1996 3023 1.3 2 1
1997 2944 2.0 4 1
1998 2505 3.3* 8 5
1999 2427 5.6 4 3
2000 2275 4.5 6 2
2001 3033 4.1 2 0
2002 2630 6.0 2 1
2003 3649 5.7 2 2
Complaints about press intrusion into grief or shock 1994–2003
Source: Press Complaints Commission
per cent in 2002 – and an increase in complaints under
all the clauses covering privacy (including Clause 5 along
with Clauses 3–4, 6–7, 9–10 and 12 of the code) to 23
per cent (PCC 2002). The commission claims that more
than 90 per cent of complainants are “ordinary people”.
(PCC 2003a) However, as the PCC’s mission is expressly
to mediate, only a tiny fraction of these complaints are
actually adjudicated by the commission (see Tulloch
1998). During the annus mirabilis of 1998 an
unprecedented total of eight complaints about intrusion
into grief were pronounced on and five upheld. Over the
next two years a further ten complaints were
adjudicated and five upheld. Although the total
proportion of complaints under Clause 5 has continued
to increase (up from 1.6 per cent in 1996 to 5.7 per
cent in 2003) the number of adjudicated complaints has
now fallen back to just two a year from 2001. 
After this flurry of activity, the PCC, having
seen off a law on privacy, now appears to feel that it has
established a form of “case law” covering complaints,
including intrusion into grief. Indeed, in 2004 for the
first time it began to print a list of “relevant precedents”
beneath each adjudication. The following principles
governing intrusion into grief have been enunciated: 
• newspapers and reporter must not break news of
death to relatives (McKeown vs Newcastle Evening
Chronicle 1997);
• reporters must not step into a property without
permission (Clement vs South Yorkshire Times 1998);
recent deaths must not be treated in a flippant or 
gratuitously humorous way (Napuk and Gibson vs 
FHM 1999);
• “recent” seems to mean a lot less than a year 
(Judith Tonner vs News of the World 2002);
• close relatives of deceased people are particularly
vulnerable in the “immediate aftermath” of a death
and certainly before the funeral (Yeomans vs
Rhondda Leader 2004);
• while it is acceptable for newspapers to publish
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criticisms of the recent dead in obituaries,
newspapers should ensure they are not handled in 
an “insensitive fashion” (Kellner vs BMJ 2004) 
(PCC 2004). 
Clause 5 and its accompanying “case law” is now seen
by the PCC as a mature statement of principle and the
most that the press should concede. In Clause 5 cases
the PCC stubbornly defended the principle of contacting
families (see, for example, Clement vs South Yorkshire
Times, Maude vs Derby Evening Telegraph PCC 2004a).
Thus, a robust defence was mounted when editors gave
evidence to the House of Commons Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee in February 2003. This attacked
the “widespread misconception that all approaches 
by the press to the bereaved are inherently intrusive”
(Editors’ Code of Practice Committee 2003 paras
4.19–4.21).
Defending Clause 5 and the practice of
contacting bereaved relatives – known in the profession
as the “death knock” – the editors argued that:
• death can allow relatives “to honour the life that has
been lost” and a report can be a kind of memorial;
• many details of a person’s life can only be known 
by their closest family, particularly where that person
is not a public figure;
• funeral directors and clergy often get facts wrong –
talking to close family is the only way to ensure 
that details are accurate;
• although some families may find the press intrusive,
others (particularly older people) may welcome
reporters who make inquiries sensitively.
Are these weasel words? The editors’ argument captures
some real dilemmas for the conscientious reporter. It
eschews sensationalism and focuses on the caring
celebration of a life by means of a report or obituary
rather than the exposure of disreputable or upsetting
detail. It invokes community and a world of responsible
local newspapers. To an interesting extent the editors’
position is backed up in Geoffrey Gorer’s study: in the
general collapse of formal mourning practices, he found
a continuing role for the local newspaper in
acknowledging a life: “When anything had been written
about the deceased in the local newspaper this was
always referred to with gratification” (Gorer op cit: 62).
What it fails to address is the messy world
of the accident or tragedy, the seizing on details and
graphic images, the pursuit of relatives of crime victims,
the relentless doorstepping of families. In other words –
the world of contemporary sensational journalism. It is
a world away from the Rochdale Observer reporting 
a murder in 1999:
“The complainant explained how upsetting the
description of the deceased injuries had been to 
the family, to whom the chosen wording, including
three references in a short article to ‘stomach cut
open’ and two to ‘guts hanging out’ had been cruel
and insensitive” (Mrs Joan Harvey vs Rochdale
Observer, 6 January 1999; PCC 2004).
The PCC upheld this complaint as well. 
Conclusion
There are roughly four overlapping positions one can
take on the issue of press behaviour:
• The journalism is a “rough old trade” argument.
Journalists are special and should not be subject 
to ordinary ethical codes – their mission is to get the
story and get it right. Codes have no role in this and
the best journalists may not be “virtuous” in any
meaningful sense. Intrusion and insensitivity is the
price of press freedom. The PCC Code is primarily a
public relations exercise, a deal with the political 
class to buy off political pressures. (Tulloch 1998)
• The “virtuous journalist” argument. Journalists
should be subject to ordinary ethical codes but
virtuous behaviour can only be based on the
operation of individual conscience. Training can
support this and so can open discussion in
newsrooms and more tolerance in news
organisations (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2003: 179 –
194) if individual journalists decide not to intrude.
Journalists should be able to appeal to the PCC 
direct if they are being asked to transgress the code. 
• The “cultural meliorism” argument. Voluntary codes
can “improve the culture of journalism” gradually 
via training and contracts. For example, the PCC
claims that by 2003 six national newspaper groups
referred to the code in staff contracts and two more
were considering including it. Legal controls will not
work because newspapers will fight and the danger
to freedom of expression outweighs the benefits
(PCC 2003a).
• The “structural determinism” argument. Codes 
and conscience will count for little in a newspaper
industry run by media combines to maximise profit.
Media concentration leads to abuse of power, the
pursuit of larger circulations and “dumbing down”.
Grief is one ingredient that sells newspapers. It 
is futile to rely on voluntary regulation – the 
statutory nettle of a privacy law must be grasped
(O’Malley and Soley 2000).
My own prejudice would be to support the virtuous
journalist argument but this is only feasible if journalists
establish a right to refuse instructions that breach the
code. This recommendation for a “conscience clause”
was made by MPs in the Privacy and Media Intrusion
report last year. (Culture, Media and Sport Committee
2003). With scarcely veiled disdain, the PCC claimed it had:
“no evidence that journalists are asked to undertake
assignments that would breach the code in the absence
of any public interest. This would in any case seem to
be a matter for the employer and employee”
(Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2004) 
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It undertook to ask the Editors’ Code Committee to
consider the proposal. Unsurprisingly, when the editors
published a much–heralded revision to the code in April,
they found no reason to undermine their own authority. 
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